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Dynamic Logics of Imperfect Information: From
Teams and Games to Transitions
Pietro Galliani
Abstract We introduce a new semantical formalism for logics of imperfect infor-
mation, based on Game Logic (and, in particular, on van Benthem, Ghosh and Lu’s
Concurrent Dynamic Game Logic). This new kind of semantics combines aspects
from game theoretic semantics and from team semantics, and demonstrates how log-
ics of imperfect information can be seen as languages for reasoning about games.
Finally we show that, for a very expressive fragment of our language, a simpler
semantics is available.
1 Introduction
The interplay between game theoretic semantics [Hintikka and Kulas, 1983, Hintikka and Sandu,
1997] and team semantics [Hodges, 1997] is one of the most distinctive phenomena
of the field of logics of imperfect information.1
In brief, a game-theoretic semantics defines, for any suitable model M and sen-
tence φ of its language, a semantic game GM(φ). Truth and falsity are the defined
in terms of properties of this games - usually in terms of the existence of winning
strategies for a designated player.2 For example, given a first-order model M, the
first-order sentence ∃x∀y(x = y) corresponds to the game in which first the existen-
tial player (also called Eloise) selects an element mx ∈ Dom(M), and afterward the
Pietro Galliani
University of Sussex, e-mail: P.Galliani@sussex.ac.uk
1 In this work, we will not describe in much detail the definitions of the logics of imperfect infor-
mation nor the motivations which led to their their development. The interested reader who is not
familiar with this field of research is referred to [Va¨a¨na¨nen, 2007b] and [Mann et al., 2011] for a
thorough introduction to the area.
2 There are exceptions, however: for example, [Sevenster and Sandu, 2010] and [Galliani, 2008]
present two, not entirely equivalent, varieties of game-theoretic semantics based on the concept of
Nash Equilibria for undetermined games.
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universal player (also called Abelard, or Nature) selects an element my ∈ Dom(M).
The play is then won by Eloise if mx = my, and by Abelard otherwise; and, from the
fact that Eloise has a winning strategy for this game in any first-order model with at
most one element, and Abelard has a winning strategy otherwise, one can conclude
that
M |= ∃x∀y(x = y)⇔ |Dom(M)| ≤ 1.
Independence-Friendly Logic (IF-Logic) is among the most studied logics of imper-
fect information ([Hintikka, 1996, Tulenheimo, 2009, Mann et al., 2011]). Its lan-
guage extends the one of first-order logic by adding slashed quantifiers (∃v/W )φ(v, . . .),
where W is a set of variables: the intended interpretation can be roughly expressed
in natural language as “There exists a v, chosen independently from W , such that
φ(v, . . .) holds”. This can be represented formally in terms of an additional require-
ment over the Skolem function corresponding to the slashed variable; but, and this is
perhaps more in keeping with the informal description of the meaning of a slashed
quantifier, the corresponding rule of game-theoretic semantics can be given as
• If the current subformula is (∃x/W )ψ and the current assignment is s, the exis-
tential player picks a value m ∈ Dom(M). The next subformula is then ψ , and the
next assignment is s[m/x].
The existential player must select the same value for x for any two assignments
which are indistinguishable modulo W .
The second part of this rule is a uniformity condition over the strategies of the ex-
istential player, and it is the only aspect with respect to which this rule differs from
the one for the usual, non-slashed existential quantifier. Because of it, the seman-
tic games corresponding to IF-Logic formulas are, in general, games of imperfect
information [Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994]. The class of the semantic games cor-
responding to IF-Logic formulas is a very natural generalization of the one of those
corresponding to First-Order formulas, and [Hintikka, 1996] puts forward a number
of convincing arguments as for why these games, and the corresponding logics, may
be deserving of investigation.
However, the usual formulation of this semantical framework is not entirely
without drawbacks. Games are complex objects, far more so than variable assign-
ments; and, furthermore, game-theoretic semantics for IF Logic is explicitly non-
compositional and does not easily lend itself to the study of the properties of open
formulas. These issues were one among the motivations for the development and
the success of team semantics [Hodges, 1997]3, an equivalent and compositional
approach to the semantics of logics of imperfect information.
In brief, team semantics can be seen as a generalization of Tarski’s compositional
semantics for First-Order Logic. The fundamental difference between Tarski seman-
tics and team semantics is that, in the latter, satisfaction is not predicated of single
assignments but instead of sets of assignments (which, after [Va¨a¨na¨nen, 2007a], will
be called teams in this work.).
3 Team semantics can also be found mentioned under the names of Hodges semantics and of trump
semantics.
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The connection between the game-theoretic semantics and the team semantics
for IF-Logic is the following:
Theorem 1.1 Let M be a first-order model, let φ be a suitable formula and let X
be a team. Then X satisfies φ in M if and only if there exists a strategy τ for Eloise
which is winning for her in GM(φ) and for all initial assignments s ∈ X.
Team semantics proved itself an extremely fruitful approach to the study of logics
of imperfect information. In particular, its discovery was fundamental for the devel-
opment of Dependence Logic, a logical formalism which is expressively equivalent
to IF-Logic4 and which separates the notion of dependence/independence from the
notion of quantification by eschewing slashed quantifiers in favor of dependence
atoms =(t1 . . . tn), whose informal meaning can be stated as “The value of the term
tn is a function of the values of the terms t1 . . . tn−1.”
Dependence Logic, in turn, was found to be an ideal ground for the discovery of
a number of meta-logical results, especially in the area of finite model theory.5
Another direction of research that saw a good amount of recent interest con-
sists in the study of logics of imperfect information obtained by adding to the lan-
guage of first-order logic atoms corresponding to non-functional notions of depen-
dence, such as Independence Logic [Gra¨del and Va¨a¨na¨nen, 2013], Multivalued De-
pendence Logic [Engstro¨m, 2010], and Inclusion/Exclusion Logic [Galliani, 2012].
The analysis of the relationship between such logics, in particular, is (at least, in the
opinion of the author) a promising and, to this moment, largely unexplored subject.6
Despite all of this, team semantics is not entirely without drawbacks either. Its
formal definition - formally elegant though it may be - obfuscates somewhat the
natural intuitions evident in the underlying game theoretic semantics. Why are the
rules for the various connectives of our logics in team semantics the ones that they
are? Why do we have these connectives, instead of the many others that could be
defined in such a framework? Even more importantly, what is the meaning of the
statement according to which a certain team X satisfies a formula φ , and under
which circumstances could one be interested in whether this statement is true or
false?
This is of particular relevance for those who, like the author, are interested in the
study of extensions and variants of Dependence Logic: without a thorough, exact
understanding of the notion of satisfiability in team semantics and of its interpreta-
tion, it would not be at all clear whether a certain system of semantic rules - natural
though it may appear from a purely formal point of view - holds any logical signifi-
cance or not.
4 Strictly speaking, this is the case only with respect to sentences. With respect to open formulas,
this is true only if the domain of the team is presumed finite and fixed.
5 We will not attempt to give here a summary of these results; apart from [Va¨a¨na¨nen, 2007a], the
interested reader could refer for example to [Kontinen and Va¨a¨na¨nen, 2009, Kontinen and Nurmi,
2009, Kontinen and Va¨a¨na¨nen, 2011, Kontinen, 2010] and Durand and Kontinen [2011]. But this
brief list far from complete.
6 [Galliani, 2012] contains a few basic results along these lines, as does [Galliani, 2011].
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The present work can be seen as an attempt to find a partial answer to these is-
sues. We will develop a semantics for logics of imperfect information which can
be seen as a generalization of both game-theoretic semantics and team semantics,
and in which formulas have a natural interpretation in terms of either specifica-
tions of games or assertions about the properties of games. The resulting formalism
can also be seen as an imperfect-information, first order variant of Game Logic
[Pauly and Parikh, 2003]; and, in fact, it is the hope of the author that the frame-
work described here will prove itself a viable starting point for the establishment of
closer relationships between these two research areas.
These notes contain little in terms of new results. This is due to their purpose:
rather than proving complex metalogical results about an established formalism, we
tried here to present, in as direct a way as we could, a novel way of considering
logics of imperfect information and their role.
We finish this introduction by mentioning a number of works on whose re-
sults these notes are based. The field of dynamic semantics, and in particular
[Groenendijk and Stokhof, 1991], was the original source of inspiration for much
of the machinery developed here. Furthermore, [Bradfield, 2000] provided many
of the insights upon which this work is based, and our compositional treatment of
games is inspired by [Abramsky, 2007]. But from a technical point of view, the for-
malism which we will present here is a direct descendant of van Benthem, Ghosh
and Lu’s Concurrent Dynamic Game Logic [van Benthem et al., 2008], and it re-
sembles in particular the “richer collective modal language” briefly mentioned in
section 4.2. of their insightful paper.
Another work, even more closely related to the present one, is the Transition De-
pendence Logic discussed in Section 3.2 of [Galliani, 2014]. However, the semantics
which will be discussed in the present paper are more general: indeed, the main pur-
pose of [Galliani, 2014] is to illustrate how the usual semantics for Dependence
Logic can be interpreted in terms of transitions and assertions about reachability in
games of imperfect information, whereas in the present work we will investigate
how Game Logic may be extended through notions from Dependence Logic.
Together, these two works can be considered two attempts – operating respec-
tively from the “Game Logic” side towards the “Dependence Logic” one and vice
versa – to highlight the profound similarities and connections between these two
largely independent areas of logical investigation and to suggest ways in which ei-
ther could benefit from the other.
2 Dynamic Logics of Imperfect Information
In this section, we will introduce our basic formalism and discuss some of its possi-
ble extensions.
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2.1 Teams, Transitions and Games
Definition 2.1 (Team variables) Let TVar be a nonempty, fixed, not necessarily
infinite set of symbols v1,v2, . . . If v ∈ TVar, we will say that v is a team variable.7
Let M be a first order model. Then AM = Dom(M)TVar is the set of all team
variable assignments over M with variables in TVar.
Definition 2.2 (Team) Let M be a first order model. A team over it is a subset of
AM, that is, a set of assignments over M.
Definition 2.3 (Transition) Let M be a first order model. A transition on M is a
partial function τ from AM to Parts(AM)\{ /0}.
The domain of τ is also called its precondition prec(τ); and its range is also
called its postcondition post(τ). If X is the precondition of τ and Y is its postcon-
dition, we will also write τ : X → Y .
Note that we require here that, under a well-defined transition, an assignment s in
its precondition always has at least one successor s′ ∈ τ(s).
Another of our main semantic concepts will be the notion of game. There exist
in the literature of number of different definitions of game, all with their advantages
and drawbacks. The usual choice in game-theoretic semantics is to deal with games
in extensive form, or, more rarely, with games in strategic form. Here, however, we
will adopt a different option:
Definition 2.4 (Games in Transition Set Form) Let M be a first order model. A
first-order game in transition set form over M is a nonempty set of transitions on M.
A strategy for the existential player in a game G = {τ1,τ2, . . .} is simply a transition
τi ∈ G.
A transition for a game describes a commitment of our existential players: if
τ(s) = X , then the existential player can ensure that, if the initial assignment is s,
the terminal assignment of the game will be in X . A choice of a strategy for Eloise
in this game, therefore, specifies a set of conditions concerning the relationship be-
tween the initial and terminal assignments of the game, as well as a belief state
(the precondition of the transition) under which the strategy is available and these
conditions may be imposed. Abelard’s strategies may then be seen as choice func-
tions σ selecting, for any τ and any assignment s ∈ prec(τ), a specific outcome
σ(τ,s) ∈ τ(s); and hence, the postcondition post(τ) of τ describes the belief state
of the existential player about the outcome of the game when τ is played starting
from an unknown belief state in prec(τ).
Let us introduce a couple of simple operations between transitions:
Definition 2.5 (Concatenation of Transitions) Let τ and τ ′ be two transitions with
post(τ) = prec(τ ′). Then τ ◦ τ ′ : prec(τ)→ post(τ ′) is the transition defined
by
(τ ◦ τ ′)(s) = {τ ′(s′) : s′ ∈ τ(s)}.
7 Or, simply, a variable.
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Definition 2.6 (Union of Transitions) Let τ0 and τ1 two transitions. Then τ0∪ τ1 :
prec(τ0)∪prec(τ1)→ post(τ0)∪post(τ1) is the transition such that
(τ0∪ τ1)(s) =


τ0(s) if s ∈ prec(τ0)\prec(τ1);
τ1(s) if s ∈ prec(τ1)\prec(τ0);
τ0(s)∪ τ1(s) if s ∈ prec(τ0)∩prec(τ1)
for all s ∈ prec(τ0)∪prec(τ1).
Using these transitions, we can define a couple of operations over games.
Definition 2.7 (Concatenation of Games) Let G and G′ be games over the same
model M. Then G;G′ is the game containing τ ◦ τ ′ for all τ ∈G and all τ ′ ∈G′ with
post(τ) = prec(τ ′).
Definition 2.8 (Choice between games) Let G0 and G1 be games over the same
model M. Then G∪G′ is the game containing τ0∪τ1 for every τ0 ∈G0 and τ1 ∈G1.
These operations on games are by no means the only ones that can be studied in this
framework. For example, we could consider a dualization operator Gd , which inter-
changes the roles of the two players; a revealing operation R(G) = (Gd)d , which
allows the second player to choose his strategy as a function of the assignment s;8 a
parallel composition operator G1||G2; an iteration operator G∗; and so on.
Some of these possibilities will be explored later; but first, let us see what we can
do with what we already defined.
2.2 First-Order Concurrent Dynamic Game Logic with Imperfect
Information
Definition 2.9 (Parameter Variables) Let PVar = {p1, p2, . . .} be a fixed, count-
ably infinite set of symbols which is disjoint from TVar and from the other symbols
of our language. We will call it the set of the parameter variables.
Definition 2.10 (Syntax) Let Σ be a first-order signature.
The game formulas of our logic are defined as
γ ::= ε | ♯v | !v | γ;γ | γ ∪ γ | φ?
where v ranges over TVar and where φ is a belief formula.
The belief formulas of our logic are defined as
φ := ⊤ | Rt | ¬Rt | t = t ′ | t 6= t ′ | ∼ φ | ∃pφ | φ ∨φ | 〈γ〉φ
8 That R(G) = (Gd)d would then follow at once from the fact that, in our formalism, the second
player – representing the environment – has no knowledge restrictions.
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where R ranges over all predicate symbols of our signature, t ranges over all tuples
of terms in our signature of the required lengths and with variables in TVar∪PVar,
v ranges over PVar and γ ranges over all game formulas.
We will define the semantics only with respect to formulas with no free parameter
variables; the extension to the case in which free parameter variables occur could be
done in the straightforward way, by considering parameter variable assignments,
but for simplicity reasons we will not treat it in this work.
Definition 2.11 (Semantics) Let M be a first order model and let γ be a game for-
mula with no free parameter variables. Then ‖γ‖M is a game on M, defined induc-
tively as follows:
1. For all teams X, τε,X : X → X ∈ ‖ε‖M, where τε,X (s) = {s} for all s ∈ X;
2. For all teams X, all variable symbols v and all functions F from X to Parts(Dom(M))\ /0,
τF,X : X → X [F/v] ∈ ‖♯v‖M, where τ(s) = s[F/v] = {s[m/v] : m ∈ F(s)} and
X [F/v] =
⋃
{s[F/v] : s ∈ X};
3. For all teams X and all variable symbols v, τ∀v,X : X → X [M/v] ∈ ‖!v‖M, where
τ∀v,X (s) = s[M/v] = {s[m/v] : m ∈ Dom(M)} and
X [M/v] =
⋃
{s[M/v] : s ∈ X};
4. If τ : X → Y ∈ ‖γ‖M and τ ′ : Y → Z ∈ ‖γ ′‖M then τ ◦ τ ′ : X → Z ∈ ‖γ;γ ′‖M;
5. If τ0 : X0 →Y0 ∈ ‖γ0‖M and τ1 : X1 →Y1 ∈ ‖γ1‖M then τ0∪τ1 : X0∪X1 →Y0∪Y1 ∈
‖γ0∪ γ1‖M;
6. If X ∈ ‖φ‖M then τX : X → X ∈ ‖φ?‖M, where τX (s) = {s} for all s ∈ X.
If φ is a belief formula then ‖φ‖M is instead a set of teams, defined as follows:
1. X ∈ ‖⊤‖M for all teams X;
2. X ∈ ‖Rt‖M if and only if X ⊆ RM;
3. X ∈ ‖¬Rt‖M if and only if X ∩RM = /0;
4. X ∈ ‖t = t ′‖M if and only if t〈s〉= t ′〈s〉 for all s ∈ X;
5. X ∈ ‖t 6= t ′‖M if and only if t〈s〉 6= t ′〈s〉 for all s ∈ X;
6. X ∈ ‖ ∼ φ‖M if and only if X 6∈ ‖φ‖M;
7. X ∈ ‖∃pφ‖M if and only if there exists an element m ∈ Dom(M) such that X ∈
‖φ [m/p]‖M;9
8. X ∈ ‖φ1∨φ2‖M if and only if X ∈ ‖φ1‖M or X ∈ ‖φ2‖M;
9. X ∈ ‖〈γ〉φ‖M if and only if there exists a team Y and a τ : X → Y ∈ ‖γ‖M such
that Y ∈ ‖φ‖M .
If τ ∈ ‖γ‖M, we will write M |=τ γ and will say that τ is a strategy of γ; and if
X ∈ ‖φ‖M, we will write M |=X φ and we will say that X satisfies γ .
If M |=X φ for all X ⊆ AM , we will say that φ is true in M, and we will write
M |= φ ; and finally, if M |= φ for all first order models M we will say that φ is valid.
As usual, we will write ⊥ for ¬⊤, φ ∧ψ for∼ (∼ φ∧∼ψ), φ →ψ for∼ φ ∨ψ ,
φ ↔ ψ for (φ → ψ)∧ (ψ → φ), ∀vφ for ¬(∃v¬φ) and [γ]φ for ∼ 〈γ〉 ∼ φ .
9 Or, to be more formal, if and only if there exists an unused constant symbol c and an element
m ∈ Dom(M) such that X ∈ ‖φ [c/p]‖M(c7→m).
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The intuition behind this logical system should be clear. Game formulas describe
games: for example, ♯v is the game in which the existential player picks new val-
ues for the variables v, γ1 ∪ γ2 is the game in which the existential player chooses
whether to play γ1 or γ2, and so on. Belief formulas describe instead conditions over
teams, that is, over belief sets; and the connection between game formulas and be-
lief formulas is given by the test operation φ?, which corresponds to the game that
merely verifies whether the initial belief state of the existential player satisfies φ ,
and by the modal operator 〈γ〉φ , which states that the existential player can play γ
and reach a final belief state in which φ holds.10
2.3 More Constructors and Atoms
Now that we have defined our basic framework, let us examine a few ways to extend
it with some of the connectives and predicates typically studied in the framework of
logics of imperfect information.
2.3.1 Tensor
The semantic rule for the disjunction of formulas that we have in our semantics is
the one corresponding to the classical disjunction: a team X satisfies φ ∨ψ if and
only if it satisfies φ or it satisfies ψ . However, in the field of logics of imperfect
information there exists another, perhaps more natural form of disjunction, which
arises directly from the game theoretical interpretation of the disjunction in classical
logic. Following [Va¨a¨na¨nen, 2007b], we will write it as φ ⊗ψ .
Its satisfaction condition is defined as follows:
• For any model M, team X and pair of (belief) formulas φ and ψ , M |=X φ ⊗ψ if
and only if there exist Y and Z such that M |=Y φ , M |=Z ψ , and X = Y ∪Z.
Can we model this connective in our framework? Certainly! Indeed, we have that
φ ⊗ψ is equivalent to
〈φ?∪ψ?〉⊤.
This can be verified simply by unraveling our definitions: indeed, M |=τ ′ φ? if and
only if τ ′ : Y → Y is such that M |=Y φ and τ ′ is the identity on Y , M |=τ ′′ ψ? if
and only if τ ′′ : Z → Z is such that M |=Z ψ and τ ′′ is the identity on Z, and hence
τ : X → X satisfies φ?∪ψ? if and only if it is the identity on X and X can be split
into two subteams which satisfy φ and ψ respectively.
Using the tensor operator, we can define inequalities of tuples of terms: more
precisely, if t1 and t2 are of the same length n we can define t1 6= t2 as
10 In other words, in 〈γ〉φ the belief formula φ specifies a winning condition for the game formula
γ .
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n⊗
i=1
(t1i 6= t2i)
It is then easy to see that M |=X t1 6= t2 if and only it t1 and t2 differ for all s ∈ X .
2.3.2 The Announcement Operator
In [Galliani, 2013], the announcement operator δ t was introduced and its proper-
ties were studied. For any model M, team X and term t of the signature of M, its
satisfaction rule can be stated as
• M |=X δ tφ if and only if for all m ∈ Dom(M), M |=X|t=m φ , where
X|t=m = {s ∈ X : t〈s〉= m}
The reason why this operator is called an announcement operator should be clear: if
a team X represents a belief state of an agent, asserting that M |=X δ tφ is equivalent
to stating that if the “true” value of the term t is announced, then updating the belief
set with this new information will lead to a state in which X is true.
In our framework, this operator can be simulated through quantification and the
tensor: indeed, if p is a parameter variable which does not occur in t or in φ , it is
trivial to see that δ tφ is equivalent to ∀p(p 6= t⊗ (p = t ∧φ)).
2.3.3 Dependencies
As we wrote in the introduction, Dependence Logic extends the language of first-
order logic with dependence atoms =(t1 . . . tn), with the intended meaning of “The
value of tn is a function of the values of t1 . . . tn−1.” Formally, this is expressed by
the following satisfaction condition:
• For any first order model M, every n ∈ N and every n-uple of terms t1 . . . tn,
M |=X=(t1 . . . tn) if and only if every s,s′ ∈ X which assign the same values to
t1 . . . tn−1 also assign the same value to tn.
These atoms can be easily represented in our formalism.
First, let us consider the case of the constancy atoms =(t), which - according to
the above condition - are satisfied in a team X if and only if the value of t is the same
for all the assignments in X .
Clearly, this atom can be defined in terms of our existential quantifier: more
precisely, if p is a variable which does not occur in t then =(t) is equivalent to
∃p(t = p).
Furthermore, we can decompose the dependence atom into announcement oper-
ators and constancy atoms: indeed, as mentioned in [Galliani, 2013], =(t1 . . . tn) is
equivalent to δ t1 . . .δtn−1 =(tn). Therefore all dependence atoms are expressible in
our formalism.
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Some recent work examined the logics obtained by adding to first-order logic
atoms corresponding to non-functional notion of dependencies. We will examine
three such dependencies here, and see how all of them can be defined using the
language of our logic:
Inclusion Atoms ([Galliani, 2012]): For all tuples of terms t1 and t2, of the same
length, all models M and all teams X , M |=X t1 ⊆ t2 if and only if for all s ∈ X
there exists a s′ ∈ X with t1〈s〉 = t2〈s′〉. Let n = |t1|= |t2|, and let p be a n-uple
of parameter variables not occurring in t1 and in t2: then t1 ⊆ t2 can be seen to
be equivalent to
∀p(p 6= t2 → p 6= t1).
Exclusion Atoms ([Galliani, 2012]): For all tuples t1 and t2 of the same length,
all models M and all teams X , M |=X t1 | t2 if and only if t1〈s〉 6= t2〈s′〉 for all
s,s′ ∈ X . Hence, a team X satisfies t1 | t2 if and only if it satisfies
∀p(p 6= t1∨p 6= t2)
where, once again, p is a tuple of fresh parameter variables.
Independence Atoms ([Gra¨del and Va¨a¨na¨nen, 2013]): Let t1, t2 and t2 be three
tuples of terms, not necessarily of the same length. Then, for all models M over
a suitable signature and for all teams X , M |=X t2 ⊥t1 t3 if and only if for all
s,s′ ∈ X with t1〈s〉= t1〈s′〉 there exists a s′′ ∈ X such that t1t2〈s〉 = t1t2〈s′′〉 and
t1t3〈s′〉= t1t3〈s′′〉.
If p2 and p3 are disjoint tuples of fresh parameter variables of the required arities
then we can express this condition as
δ t1∀p2∀p3(t2t3 6= p2p3 → (t2 6= p2∨ t3 6= p3)).
2.3.4 Variable Hiding
As mentioned in the introduction, IF-Logic adds to the language of first-order logic
slashed quantifiers (∃v/W )φ , where W is a set of formulas, with the intended mean-
ing of “there exists a v, chosen independently from v, such that φ”.
In our framework, it is possible to detach this notion of variable hiding from the
very notion of quantification as follows:
Definition 2.12 (Independent Transitions) Let M be a first order model, let W ⊆
TVar be a set of team variables, and let τ : X → Y be a transition. We say that τ is
independent on W if and only if
s≡W s
′⇒ τ(s) = τ(s′)
for all s,s′ ∈ X, where s≡W s′ if and only if s(v) = s′(v) for all v ∈ TVar\W.
Definition 2.13 (Variable Hiding) Let G = {τ1,τ2, . . .} be a game in transition
form over a first order model M, and let W be a set of variables. Then (G/W ) is
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the game defined as
(G/W ) = {τi : τi ∈G,τi independent on W}.
Hence, for every game formula γ and for every W we can now define the game
formula γ/W , whose interpretation in a model M is given by
GM(γ/W ) = (GM(γ)/W ).
In the terms in which we formulated our semantics, this corresponds to the following
rule:
• For all M, τ and γ , τ ∈ ‖γ/W‖M if and only if τ ∈ ‖γ‖M and τ is independent on
W .
It is trivial to see that this definition gives to the game formula ♯v/W the same
interpretation of the IF Logic quantifier ∃v/W .
2.4 Iteration
Another of the operations typically considered in Game Logic is iteration: in brief,
given a game γ , the game γ∗ is the one in which γ is played zero, one or more times,
and the existential player chooses when to exit the “loop”.
This can be described in our framework as follows:
• For all M, all game formulas γ and all transitions τ : X → Y , M |=τ γ if and only
if there exists a n ∈ N and strategies τ0 . . .τn−1 such that M |=τi γ for all i and
τ = τε,X ◦ τ0 ◦ . . .◦ τn−1.
2.5 Intuitionistic Implication
The intuitionistic implication was defined in [Abramsky and Va¨a¨na¨nen, 2008] as
follows:
• For all M and all belief formulas φ1 and φ2, M |=X φ1 →֒ φ2 if and only if for
every Y ⊆ X such that M |=Y φ1 it holds that M |=Y φ2.
The properties of this operator were then studied in [Yang, 2010], where it was
shown that the expressive power of dependence logic augmented with this operator
is expressively equivalent to full second order logic.
Nothing, in principle, prevents us from adding this operation directly to our lan-
guage.
However, it is perhaps more interesting to consider an idea mentioned (not in re-
lation to intuitionistic implication) in [van Benthem et al., 2008] and define first the
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inclusion operator 〈⊆〉φ , where φ is a belief formula, whose satisfaction condition
is given by
• For all models M and teams X , M |=X 〈⊆〉φ if and only if there exists a Y ⊆ X
such that M |=Y φ .
As usual, we can define [⊆]φ as∼ (〈⊆〉(∼ φ)); and it is now easy to see that φ1 →֒ φ2
is equivalent to [⊆](φ1 → φ2).
2.6 Parallel Composition
As the last connective for this work, we will now consider the parallel composition.
A naive implementation of such an operator stumbles into a small, quite obvious
problem: how should we deal with parallel games in which both “branches” modify
the same variable? Many possible answers, some of which rather sophisticated, have
been considered in other contexts; here, however, we will favor the straightforward,
if somewhat brutal, option of requiring that no variable is modified in both branches.
Definition 2.14 (Affected Variables) Let γ be any game formula. The set Aff(γ)of
its affected variables is defined inductively as follows:
1. Aff(ε) = /0;
2. For all belief formulas φ , Aff(φ?) = /0;
3. For all team variables v, Aff(♯v) = Aff(!v) = {v};
4. For all game formulas γ and γ ′, Aff(γ;γ ′) = Aff(γ ∪ γ ′) = Aff(γ||γ ′) =
Aff(γ)∪Aff(γ ′);
5. For all sets of variables W, Aff(γ/W ) = Aff(γ).
Given this definition, we can add the parallel composition to our syntax:
• If γ1 and γ2 are two game formulas with Aff(γ1)∩Aff(γ2) = /0, then γ1||γ2 is a
game formula.
But how to define its semantics?
As for the cases of sequential composition and union, it will be useful to first
define the parallel composition of two transitions.
Definition 2.15 (Parallel Composition of Transitions) Let τ0 : X → Y0 and τ1 :
X → Y1 be two transitions, and let v0, v1 be two disjoint tuples of variables. Then
τ0(v0||v1)τ1 is the transition given by
(τ0(v0||v1)τ1)(s) = {s[m0/v0][m1/v1] : ∃s0 ∈ τ0(s),
s2 ∈ τ1(s) s.t. m0 = s0(v0) and m1 = s1(v1)}.
At this point, defining the semantic rule for parallel composition is trivial:
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• For all M, for all γ0 and γ1 with Aff(γ0)∩Aff(γ1) = /0, M |=τ γ0||γ1 if and only if
there exist τ0 and τ1 such that M |=τ0 γ0, M |=τ1 γ1 and τ = τ0(Aff(γ0)||Aff(γ1))τ1.
In principle, nothing would prevent us from also defining a γ0(v0||v1)γ1 operator,
along similar lines: such an operator would correspond to playing γ0 and γ1 in par-
allel, and at the end of the game updating the assignment according to γ0 for the
variables in v0 and according to γ1 for the variables in v1.
It is worth observing that the postcondition of a parallel composition cannot be
inferred by the postconditions of its components.
For example, let s0 and s1 be two assignments with s0(v) = s0(w) = 0 and s1(v) =
s1(w) = 1, and consider the transitions
τ : {s0,s1}→ {s0,s1},τ(s0) = {s0},τ(s1) = {s1};
τ ′ : {s0,s1}→ {s0,s1},τ(s0) = {s1},τ(s1) = {s0}.
Now, τ and τ ′ have the same precondition and postcondition. However, it is easy to
see that post(τ(v|w)τ) = {s0,s1}, whereas post(τ(v|w)τ ′ = {s0[1/w],s1[0/w]}.
Because of this phenomenon, parallel composition - as well as the general version
of our variable hiding operator - will not be treatable in the simpler semantics that
we will develop in the next section.
3 Transition Semantics
In the semantics that we have developed so far, the interpretation of a game formula
consists in the set of the transitions it allows – or, equivalently, in the set of all the
strategies available to the existential player in the corresponding game.
It is natural, at this point, to question whether it is necessary to carry all this
information in our rules. After all, the only way in which the interpretation of a belief
formula may depend on the interpretation of a game formula is if the belief formula
contains a subexpression of the form 〈γ〉φ ; and, in this case, all that is relevant to
our interpretation is the pre- and postconditions of the transitions for γ , and not the
details of which initial assignments can go to which sets of final assignments.
Therefore, it is natural to consider the following, alternative semantics for our
game formulas:
Definition 3.1 (Transition Semantics) Let M be a first order model, let X and Y
be teams, and let γ be a game formula over the signature of M. Then we write
M |=X→Y γ , and we say that X → Y is an admissible transition for γ , if and only if
there exists a τ ∈ ‖γ‖M with prec(τ) = X and post(τ) =Y .
Of course, this definition makes sense as a semantics only if game connectives
are compatible with it, in the sense that the pre- and post- conditions of the strategies
for a composed game are a function of the pre- and post- conditions of the strategies
for its components. As we already saw, the parallel composition operator does not
satisfy this condition: hence, we will exclude it from the analysis of this section.
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Furthermore, the slashing operator is also incompatible with Definition 3.1. In-
deed, let s0 and s1 be two assignments with s0(x) = 0, s1(x) = 1, and s0 ≡x s1, and
let G0 = {τ} and G1 = {τ ′}, where
• τ : {s0,s1}→ {s0,s1}, τ(s0) = {s0,s1}, τ(s1) = {s0,s1};
• τ ′ : {s0,s1}→ {s0,s1}, τ
′(s0) = {s0}, τ
′(s1) = {s0};
From the point of view of pre- and postconditions, these two games are absolutely
identical: indeed, both of them accept only {s0,s1} as an initial belief state, and
return it as the only possible output belief state.
However, G0/{x}= G0 while G1/W is empty.
For this reason, we will consider here the following subset of our language:
Definition 3.2 (Transition Logic) Transition Logic is the sublanguage of our for-
malism in which
1. The parallel composition operator does not occur;
2. The variable hiding operator may only be applied to game formulas of the form
♯v.
This language is very expressive: in particular, it is easily seen to be as expressive
as Team Logic [Va¨a¨na¨nen, 2007b], and hence, by [Kontinen and Nurmi, 2009], as
full Second Order Logic.
And for this sublanguage, transition semantics is indeed compositional.
Theorem 3.3 (Rules for Transition Semantics) Let M be a first order model and
let X and Y be teams. Then
1. M |=X→Y ε if and only if X = Y ;
2. M |=X→Y ♯v if and only if there exists a F such that Y = X [F/v];
3. M |=X→Y ♯v/W if and only if there exists a F, independent on W, such that Y =
X [F/v];
4. M |=X→Y !v if and only if Y = X [M/v];
5. M |=X→Y γ1;γ2 if and only if there exists a Z such that M |=X→Z γ1 and M |=Z→Y
γ2;
6. M |=X→Y γ1∪γ2 if and only if there exist X1, X2, Y1 and Y2 such that M |=X1→Y1 γ1,
M |=X2→Y2 γ2, X1∪X2 = X and Y1∪Y2 = Y;
7. M |=X→Y φ? if and only if M |=X φ and X = Y;
8. M |=X→Y γ∗ if and only if there exists a n ∈ N and Z1,Z2, . . .Zn such that
• Z1 = X;
• Zn = Y;
• For all i = 1 . . .n− 1, M |=Zi→Zi+1 γ .
Furthermore, let M be a first order model, let γ be a game formula over it and let
φ be a belief formula over it. Then, for all teams X, M |=X 〈γ〉φ if and only if there
exists a Y such that M |=X→Y γ and M |=Y φ .
Proof. None of the cases poses any difficulty whatsoever. As an example, we show
the case of the sequential composition operator.
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⇒: Suppose that M |=X→Y γ1;γ2. Then, by definition, there exists a τ : X →Y such
that M |=τ γ1;γ2. But this can be the case only if there exists a Z, a τ1 : X → Z and
a τ2 : Z →Y such that M |=τ1 γ1, M |=τ2 γ2 and τ = τ1 ◦τ2. Therefore, M |=X→Z γ1
and M |=Z→Y γ2, as required.
⇐: Suppose that M |=X→Z γ1 and M |=Z→Y γ2. Then there exist two transitions
τ1 : X → Z and τ2 : Z → Y such that M |=τ1 γ1 and M |=τ2 γ2. Hence, M |=τ1◦τ2
γ1;γ2; and finally, M |=X→Y γ1;γ2, as required.
This framework can be extended in many different ways: for example, we could eas-
ily add new operations, such as generalized quantifiers after [Engstro¨m, 2010], or
atomic games from our signature, or generalized atomic formulas as in [Kuusisto,
2011]. Or we could add even more game operations, such as for example a ad-
versaral choice γ1 ∩ γ2,11 or we could consider a multi-agent framework as in
[Abramsky, 2007], or we could consider the equilibrium semantics-based variant
of this formalism, or so on: in general, it appears that much of what has been done
in the field of logics of imperfect information can, at least in principle, be transferred
to this formalism.
In conclusion, it is the hope of the author that the above described transition
semantics may provide an useful unifying framework for a number of distinct con-
tributions to the filed, as well as a contribution to the exploration of the relationship
between logics of imperfect information and logics of games.
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